SIM swaps and port-out scams are a fact of life. New rules aren't likely to change that.
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Banks are consistently the goddamned worst about supporting good security practices.The real problem is that banks seem to be ones that use SMS almost exclusively. I have accounts at maybe a half dozen banks and I don't think a single one offers anything other than SMS 2FA.
Dan Goodin said:Attackers can mimic the distinct idiolect of the target.
It's absolutely insane to me that my cell provider, T-Mobile, has support for a proper authenticator app while my bank does not.The real problem is that banks seem to be ones that use SMS almost exclusively. I have accounts at maybe a half dozen banks and I don't think a single one offers anything other than SMS 2FA.
I’ve had “dom.clipboard.events” disabled in FF for years, almost entirely because stupid banks do this with every field, including ones like wire and ACH instructions that are SAFER to paste it from databases. Bank IT seems to think that inconvenience == security. It’s a really bizarre take, but it seems industry-wide.Banks are consistently the goddamned worst about supporting good security practices.
They're also the ones most likely to block pasting into auth fields, which basically cockblocks using password managers and good, unique passwords. I fired my previous credit union over that one and made it very clear why, on the off chance they cared.
StopTheMadness can bypass a lot of these blocks on Apple platforms. It is a paid solution though.They're also the ones most likely to block pasting into auth fields, which basically cockblocks using password managers and good, unique passwords.
I insist it's decidedly not better than nothing. By hijacking the mobile number, a password reset becomes a cinch. But without SMS, that vulnerable attack vector doesn't work. I'd rather have my strong, unique password not be resettable via easy-to-compromise SMS 2FA. At least my carrier, Verizon Wireless, offers the pin feature.Nothing will change if the carriers are choosing the method. If you must use a phone number for SMS 2FA use a VOIP service like Google Voice since that's ironically easier to control and secure.
Really what we need is for companies (banks are the worst offenders IMO) to stop using SMS based 2fa in the first place, because while it's better than nothing, it's about the worst 2fa there is.
Nothing will change if the carriers are choosing the method. If you must use a phone number for SMS 2FA use a VOIP service like Google Voice since that's ironically easier to control and secure.
Really what we need is for companies (banks are the worst offenders IMO) to stop using SMS based 2fa in the first place, because while it's better than nothing, it's about the worst 2fa there is.
“We always ask them for their address and mother’s unmarried name. We believe this meets the standard for ‘secure authentication.’”
Even better is how the US federal government is the worst offender on using SSN alone to authenticate people. You constantly have to tell it to people if you deal with the DOD. While still maintaining the pretense that it's a secret number that you shouldn't tell people.
I read once that the SSN was specifically never supposed to be used for any sort of personal identification outside of the social security system itself.Even better is how the US federal government is the worst offender on using SSN alone to authenticate people. You constantly have to tell it to people if you deal with the DOD. While still maintaining the pretense that it's a secret number that you shouldn't tell people.
I insist it's decidedly not better than nothing. By hijacking the mobile number, a password reset becomes a cinch. But without SMS, that vulnerable attack vector doesn't work. I'd rather have my strong, unique password not be resettable via easy-to-compromise SMS 2FA.
Give me TOTP at least. All my other 2FA-enabled accounts offer TOTP except my stupid bank even after much carping to their security team. But banks don't want to use TOTP because too many muggles can't safely manage the secrets and not lose them through stupidity or ignorance.
Or the carrier could send a text message, app notification, or email asking for confirmation of the transfer. The confirmation could be bypassed if the phone was reported as lost through Apple or google’s phone tracker service.If the victim's SIM card is still in a phone that's turned on, wouldn't the carrier see that and refuse to transfer it?
Yeah, I've seen that before but it's luckily been with companies that aren't majorly dangerous if there's a compromise. If my banks required my carrier number, I'd switch banks.I use Google Voice for SMS 2FA whenever I can, but a lot of companies will specifically not let you use a Google Voice number, saying it has to be a "real" phone number. More rarely, it'll take the Google Voice number but then the text messages just don't send/arrive until you switch to a "real" number.
Easy solution - make carriers financially responsible for consumer losses.
The painful part is usually arguing with the retention team to get the port out code, but anyone that does these scams would be good at that.I was porting out my phone number and it was a pain in the ass it wasn't easy at all.
Small banks or big ones? That's crazy. All the banks I have accounts at (not twenty lol, we don't even have twenty different banks in the whole country!) offer some sort of OTP smartphone app, "secured" by a PIN or biometrics or both.The real problem is that banks seem to be ones that use SMS almost exclusively. I have accounts at maybe a half dozen banks and I don't think a single one offers anything other than SMS 2FA.
The procedure for telcos here is outlined by law, and requires them to give you an OTP porting number on request. Which they won't without a national ID (which they did scan for the valid checksum last time I did that, but that obviously won't work without national IDs), or at least a passphrase told to the helpline or a valid login into the web app.The painful part is usually arguing with the retention team to get the port out code, but anyone that does these scams would be good at that.
Part of the problem is that the employee that transfers the number to a new sim is in on it a lot of the time. Which is so incredibly shocking given their low pay and easy access to powerful administrative tools…/sIf the victim's SIM card is still in a phone that's turned on, wouldn't the carrier see that and refuse to transfer it?
I read once that the SSN was specifically never supposed to be used for any sort of personal identification outside of the social security system itself.
I could be accidentally spreading bullshit but it wouldn't surprise me if true.
What I recall is they specifically had to promise it wouldn't be used as an ID number to get the legislation passed. And when it was new people would get their SSN tattooed on their arm so they couldn't forget it.
Hands up if you literally read that in CWV. puts up hand[Christopher Walken voice]Sorry but how does this help? It seems unlikely the CSR is also a close, personal friend of the target.[/CWV]
SMS allows multiple devices and no issues when you get a new phone. I have yet to get an Authenticator to work on multiple devices and I dread getting a new phone.
Fortunately there are no negative historical connotations for ID numbers tattooed on arms.
Huh I'll be damned. For some reason I had it in my head that the social security program as we know it was a 50s thing but you're right.It was before the Holocaust.
It just shows that the number was very much not considered secret, but really important to remember so you could get your benefits.
Even better is how the US federal government is the worst offender on using SSN alone to authenticate people. You constantly have to tell it to people if you deal with the DOD. While still maintaining the pretense that it's a secret number that you shouldn't tell people.